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| Start Page | Drug Immorality | Cancer Immorality | Wisdom Of Socrates | Tables Of Contents |
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Socrates
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The most interesting and influential thinker in the fifth century was Socrates, whose dedication to careful reasoning transformed the entire enterprise. Since he sought genuine knowledge rather than mere victory over an opponent, Socrates employed the same logical tricks developed by the Sophists to a new purpose, the pursuit of truth. Thus, his willingness to call everything into question and his determination to accept nothing less than an adequate account of the nature of things make him the first clear exponent of critical philosophy. Although he was well known
during his own time for his conversational skills and public
teaching, Socrates wrote nothing, so we are dependent upon his
students (especially
Xenophon
and
Plato) for any detailed knowledge of his methods and
results. The trouble is that Plato was himself a philosopher who
often injected his own theories into the dialogues he presented
to the world as discussions between Socrates and other famous
figures of the day. Nevertheless, it is usually assumed that at
least the early dialogues of Plato provide a (fairly) accurate
representation of Socrates himself. Euthyphro: What is Piety?
In the
Euqufrwn (Euthyphro),
for example,
Socrates engaged in a sharply critical conversation
with an over-confident young man. Finding Euthyphro perfectly
certain of his own ethical rectitude even in the morally
ambiguous situation of prosecuting his own father in court,
Socrates asks him to define what "piety" (moral
duty) really is. The demand here is for something more than
merely a list of which actions are, in fact, pious; instead,
Euthyphro is supposed to provide a general
definition that captures the very essence of what piety is.
But every answer he offers is subjected to the full force of
Socrates's critical thinking, until nothing certain remains.
Specifically, Socrates systematically refutes Euthyphro's suggestion that what makes right actions right is that the gods love (or approve of) them. First, there is the obvious problem that, since questions of right and wrong often generate interminable disputes, the gods are likely to disagree among themselves about moral matters no less often than we do, making some actions both right and wrong. Socrates lets Euthypro off the hook on this one by aggreeing—only for purposes of continuing the discussion—that the gods may be supposed to agree perfectly with each other. (Notice that this problem arises only in a polytheistic culture.) More significantly, Socrates generates a formal dilemma from a (deceptively) simple question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (Euthyphro 10 a) Neither alternative can do the work for which Euthyphro intends his definition of piety. If right actions are pious only because the gods love them, then moral rightness is entirely arbitrary, depending only on the whims of the gods. If, on the other hand, the gods love right actions only because they are already right, then there must be some non-divine source of values, which we might come to know independently of their love. In fact, this dilemma proposes a significant difficulty at the heart of any effort to define morality by reference to an external authority. (Consider, for example, parallel questions with a similar structure: "Do my parents approve of this action because it is right, or is it right because my parents approve of it?" or "Does the College forbid this activity because it is wrong, or is it wrong because the College forbids it?") On the second alternative in each case, actions become right (or wrong) solely because of the authority's approval (or disapproval); its choice, then, has no rational foundation, and it is impossible to attribute laudable moral wisdom to the authority itself. So this horn is clearly unacceptable. But on the first alternative, the authority approves (or disapproves) of certain actions because they are already right (or wrong) independently of it, and whatever rational standard it employs as a criterion for making this decision must be accessible to us as well as to it. Hence, we are in principle capable of distinguishing right from wrong on our own. Thus, an application of
careful techniques of reasoning results in genuine (if negative)
progress in the resolution of a philosophical issue. Socrates's
method of insistent questioning at least helps us to eliminate
one bad answer to a serious question. At most, it points us
toward a significant degree of intellectual independence. The
character of Euthyphro, however, seems unaffected by the entire
process, leaving the scene at the end of the dialogue no less
self-confident than he had been at its outset. The use of
Socratic methods, even when they clearly result in a rational
victory, may not produce genuine conviction in those to whom
they are applied.
Apology: The Examined Life
Because of his political
associations with an earlier regime, the Athenian democracy put
Socrates on trial, charging him with undermining state
religion and corrupting young people. The speech he offered in
his own defense, as reported in Plato's
Apologhma (Apology),
provides us with many reminders of the central features of
Socrates's approach to philosophy and its relation to practical
life.
Plato's dramatic picture of a
man willing to face death rather than abandoning his commitment
to philosophical inquiry offers up Socrates as a model for all
future philosophers. Perhaps few of us are presented with the
same stark choice between philosophy and death, but all of us
are daily faced with opportunities to decide between convenient
conventionality and our devotion to truth and reason. How we
choose determines whether we, like Socrates, deserve to call our
lives philosophical. Crito: The Individual and the State
Plato's
description of
Socrates's final days continued in the
Kritwn (Crito).
Now in prison awaiting execution, Socrates displays the same
spirit of calm reflection about serious matters that had
characterized his life in freedom. Even the patent injustice of
his fate at the hands of the Athenian jury produces in Socrates
no bitterness or anger. Friends arrive at the jail with a
foolproof plan for his escape from Athens to a life of voluntary
exile, but Socrates calmly engages them in a rational debate
about the moral value of such an action.
Of course Crito and the others know their teacher well, and they come prepared to argue the merits of their plan. Escaping now would permit Socrates to fulfil his personal obligations in life. Moreover, if he does not follow the plan, many people will suppose that his friends did not care enough for him to arrange his escape. Therefore, in order to honor his commitments and preserve the reputation of his friends, Socrates ought to escape from jail. But Socrates dismisses these
considerations as irrelevant to a decision about what action is
truly right. What other people will say clearly doesn't matter.
As he
had argued in the Apology, the only opinion that
counts is not that of the majority of people generally, but
rather that of the one individual who truly knows. The truth
alone deserves to be the basis for decisions about human action,
so the only proper apporoach is to engage in the sort of careful
moral reasoning by means of which one may hope to reveal it. Socrates's argument proceeds from the statement of a perfectly general moral principle to its application in his particular case:
The argument is a valid one, so we are committed to accepting its conclusion if we believe that its premises are true. The general commitment to act rightly is fundamental to a moral life, and it does seem clear that Socrates's escape would be a case of disobedience. But what about the second premise, the claim that it is always wrong for an individual to disobey the state? Surely that deserves further examination. In fact, Socrates pictures the laws of Athens proposing two independent lines of argument in favor of this claim: First, the state is to us as a parent is to a child, and since it is always wrong for a child to disobey a parent, it follows that it is always wrong to disobey the state. (Crito 50e) Here we might raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of the analogy between our parents and the state. Obedience to our parents, after all, is a temporary obligation that we eventually outgrow by learning to make decisions for ourselves, while Socrates means to argue that obeying the state is a requirement right up until we die. Here it might be useful to apply the same healthy disrespect for moral authority that Socrates himself expressed in the Euthyphro. The second argument is that it is always wrong to break an agreement, and since continuing to live voluntarily in a state constitutes an agreement to obey it, it is wrong to disobey that state. (Crito 52e) This may be a better argument; only the second premise seems open to question. Explicit agreements to obey some authority are common enough—in a matriculation pledge or a contract of employment, for example—but most of us have not entered into any such agreement with our government. Even if we suppose, as the laws suggest, that the agreement is an implicit one to which we are committed by our decision to remain within their borders, it is not always obvious that our choice of where to live is entirely subject to our individual voluntary control. Nevertheless, these considerations are serious ones. Socrates himself was entirely convinced that the arguments hold, so he concluded that it would be wrong for him to escape from prison. As always, of course, his actions conformed to the outcome of his reasoning. Socrates chose to honor his commitment to truth and morality even though it cost him his life.
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